European Football Review 12th-14th November 2026
Covering the fifth round of Nations League group stage games.
Turkey 1-2 Belgium
Sergen Yalçın's first game in charge got off to a good start as Turkey took the lead but Belgium scored two goals in the first half coming through overloads on their left flank. Under Vincenzo Montella Turkey's attacking players rotated more, which helped them accumulate lots of possession and shots but under a less top heavy attack they did not create the same level of chances they were in previous games. Belgium under Mark van Bommel did not dominate possession but they did have a clear chance creation edge as they knew when to stay compact and when to press. Yalçın did make some second half adjustments which improved Turkey's chance creation but it wasn't enough for them to get a result. I thought Turkey would have had value as underdogs of half a goal going by chance creation in previous games but Belgium were able to target Turkey's defensive weaknesses without giving up as much danger at the other end so there may have been value on Belgium.
Italy 3-1 France
France started out attacking with a lot of pressure and they took the lead in the first half. Italy responded taking advantage of a quick transition down their left flank and scored an equaliser. France dominated possession but Italy had the better chance creation as when French attacks broke down, they were able to start quick counterattacks. With Italy being underdogs of half a goal going into the game, I think there was value on them.
Czech Republic 0-2 Spain
This was a relatively comfortable win for Spain even if they did not score their second goal until very late in the game. Although Spain were missing certain starters such as Lamine Yamal, they dominated possession and tried to stretch the compact Czech defence but clear chances were not easy to come by. In the second half the Czech Republic did cause danger by using their physical aerial presence to bypass Spain's structure and contest balls in the box, and Spanish players are generally not the tallest. Spain went direct with some long balls of their own as this gave them the chance to initiate attacks before the Czech defence could retreat into a compact structure. Chance creation was a clear edge for Spain but it was close to the two or so goals Spain were favoured by before the game so this game may have been fairly priced.
England 2-1 Croatia
This was a very different story from England's 7-0 win in Croatia earlier in the campaign. Croatia started by pressing high up the pitch but this left them exposed to England's attacks. After they conceded the opener, Croatia retreated and became more compact. This suppressed chance creation on both sides for a while. Croatia equalised after the break through a set piece and the end of the game was far from comfortable for England. I thought there would be value on England to win be two or more goals based on what I had seen of the last two games these teams played against each other but Slaven Bilić did make adjustments since the 7-0 defeat, playing less openly this time. Because of this, I think there was some value on Croatia to cover the spread.
Moldova 2-1 Kazakhshtan
Moldova were slight favourites going into this game and they won a game with low chance creation. Moldova's compact structure was able to prevent Kazakhstan from creating chances and when Kazakhstan lost possession, Moldova were able to use quick transitions to create the chances they needed to win. I think there was a small edge on Moldova in this game.
Serbia vs Germany
I thought Serbia might be able to hold up better against Germany this time with a slightly different formation to the 5-4-1 they used in Germany but even with two strikers Serbia struggled to string passes together. Whenever they would get the ball the German players pressed them and they made loose passes that recycled possession to Germany. Germany were favoured by a bit over a goal and a half going into the game and going by chance creation they exceeded that by a bit and so I think there was some value on them.
Luxembourg 0-1 Estonia
Luxembourg struggled to create chances against an Estonia team with a compact structure where three at the back were able to match Luxembourg's forward line while the wingbacks pushed further up the pitch in possession. Estonia were able to create opportunities through build up and set pieces. Estonia had a chance creation edge and so with Luxembourg slightly favoured before the game, I think Estonia had some value.
The Dutch 7-0 Greece
This was a somewhat surprising game not just because of the scoreline but also because the Dutch were not dominating possession, as Dutch teams tend to do. When they did have the ball they consistently found space between Greece's lines and got the ball out to the flanks where they were able to cross it across goal where Dutch players were anticipating the ball. In the previous game between these sides, Greece took advantage of disorganisation within the Dutch team but Xavi made adjustments at half time that helped the Dutch escape with a draw. In this game, Greece's approach was generally very similar but the Dutch approach was more effective at taking advantage of Greece's structure.
Slovenia 0-0 Switzerland
A game low on chance creation ended in a stalemate. Slovenia played very compactly and Switzerland dominated possession but struggled to create chances. Some sources attribute the Slovenia formation to a 4-4-2 but as far as I can tell it was a 4-5-1 in practice. This my have been why Switzerland did not consistently create chances the way they normally do against more defensive teams as that extra man can prevent wide overloads. I had no on both teams to score and I think that was supported by chance creation. I also had Switzerland to win but now I would say there was value on Switzerland not to win as they were favoured by three quarters of a goal going into this game.
Slovakia 2-2 Faroe Islands
The Faroese deployed a 3-4-3 with three centre backs and three forwards acting as an outlet for balls to the front, which they generally look to find in transition. Slovakia dominated possession but the Faroese defended effectively enough to allow their counterattacking threat to create opportunities. The game ended up with chance creation close between both sides and so with the Faroe Islands underdogs by a goal and a half before the game, I think there was some value on them to cover the spread.
Sweden 3-2 Bosnia and Herzegovina
This game played out differently to how I expected with Sweden going 3-0 up in the first half with sloppy defending for the first goal and then two penalties conceded. Bosnia pulled two goals back in the second half with more effective link up play between the midfield and forward line but it wasn't enough to draw level. Going by chance creation Sweden a clear edge but two of those were penalties and Sweden were also favoured by over a goal going into this game. Bosnia's defensive lapses are a concern since they generally are solid defensively but they were able to stretch Sweden's midfield so there may have still been some value on them in spite of everything.
Portugal 1-4 Denmark
This was another game where what happened was not what I expected. Denmark threatened the space behind Portugal's lines which their new high press left and they also presented a threat from set pieces. I should have anticipated this as a new weakness of Portugal's structure but the manner in which Portugal pressed Denmark high up the pitch in the previous fixture was one which was likely to reproduce itself in Portugal. I should possibly have put more weight on Denmark being caught off guard in the previous fixture because it was a change in system from Roberto Martínez and so Denmark were likely to make tactical adjustments. In particular, they stayed more compact, focused on transitions and gave Bruno Fernandes less space. Portugal were also missing some first team players which made their attack less effective. I would say there was value on Denmark this time.
Austria 1-0 Ireland
This was a game where Ireland's compact system with five at the back came up against Austria's gegenpress and was able to not only withstand the pressure but also find opportunities at the other end. Austria took the lead later in the second half and were able to see it out from there though Ireland did have opportunities to equalise. Austria did have a clear chance creation edge though Ireland did have a shaky start. Tactically Ireland were matching up decently with Austria for long stretches of the game so I am reluctant to say Austria had the edge in this so I will leave it at that.
Two conflicting trends dictate the Senate outcome in 2026. The map heavily favors Republicans, as the competitive Senate seats up lean heavily Republican. By contrast, the election context heavily favors Democrats, with war, recession, realignment and scandal tipping in their direction. A deeper dive reveals why prediction markets still likely undersell Democratic prospects.
First, the idea that Senate midterms favor the party out of power in the White House is belied by both recent and a century of history of Senate elections. Unlike the House, only a third of Senate seats face election in any midterm, and that map dictates outcomes unless the election context is particularly bad for the incumbent party.
Consider that the highly unpopular Biden didn’t lost any net Senate seats in 2022 and Trump added Senate seats in the Democratic friendly cycle in 2018. Equally, Clinton didn’t lose net Senate seats in 1998 nor did W. in 2002. Even low-approval election cycles like 1966 and 1982 didn’t produce a big swing in the Senate. Indeed, since 1934, the party in power only lost 10% or more of their Senate seats (4+) less than half of the time. Democrats need a flip of exactly that — at least 4 Senate seats — to retake power in the Senate.
Then take a look at the map, and you can see the reason for optimism in GOP circles and some traders in the prediction markets. Only 2 GOP-held seats are in states Trump won by less than double digits, while 2 Democratic-held seats are in states Trump won, and one of those GOP held seats features a long-time incumbent who typically runs double-digits ahead of the GOP norm (Collins in Maine). This is why the GOP entered the year believing odds of losing the Senate were remote, and the prediction markets mostly concurred.
But this ignores the counter-trend: the degree of election dismay with the incumbent party in the White House, and the reasons for that dismay. Presidential job approval has not been a neat proxy for Senate midterms because it depends on the reason for that dissatisfaction in the electorate. Four factors drive Senatorial midterms: war, recession/cost of living, realignment, and scandal. When two of those four factors are not present and don’t dominate, then the incumbent party’s odds of losing 4+ Senate seats drops to less than 20%. By contrast, when two of those four factors are present and do predominate, then the odds of the incumbent party losing 4+ Senate seats rises to 100%. Indeed, the median number of Senate seats lost when some combination of war, recession, realignment and scandal, are present, the White House party loses at least 8 Senate seats.
A few examples: while FDR added Senate seats in 1934 midterms, he lost 9 in 1938 midterms due to the combination of recession and scandal (trying to stack SCOTUS). 1942 and 1946 gave us war and recession to cost Democrats 8 and 12 Senate seats alike. 1950 gave us war again and scandals concerning the war costing Democrats 5 Senate seats. 1958 gave us recession and scandal, costing Ike 15 Senate seats. While JFK added Senate seats in 1962 and Nixon added Senate seats in 1970, only Watergate and stagflation in 1974 or the combination of Iran Contra and vulnerable class of 1980 incumbents cost the incumbent party 4 or more Senate seats until the realignment election of 1994, where evangelicals shifted their down-ballot voting to the GOP en masse. It took war and scandal in 2006 to see the Senate switch 4+ Senate seats again.
That’s the story of 2026: a very GOP favorable Senate map versus a very Democratic friendly election cycle. The GOP enters election season with all four factor present: war, recession/cost of living, realignment, and scandal. The Iran War was already deeply unpopular, and it’s impact on the economy in gas and diesel prices turns Americans sour on their current economic prospects, as wages fall behind, housing and health care feel increasingly unaffordable, labor force participation continues to drop, the the mirage of AI keeps the GDP just above a technical recession. The Epstein scandal remains one of the worst scandals in American political history, and Trump managed to associate himself deeply with the scandal in his handling of it. Then the realignment, as the new Trump 2024 voters joined the Obama-Trump converts of 2016 in abandoning GOP identity, already evident in surveys and primary participation.
A quintet of voter groups appear to be realigning away from the Republican brand — hispanic voters, black voters, industrial area voters, libertarian-leaning voters, and war-skeptical voters alike. This realigning electorate shows up disproportionately in key Senate contests. The war-skeptical voters in states like Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, and Alaska (these are the states W failed to gain in between 2000 and 2004 due to the Iraq War before it even turned unpopular). The hispanic voters in states like Florida and Texas. The African-American voters in states like North Carolina and Georgia. The industrial voters in Ohio and Michigan. The libertarian leaving voters in states like New Hampshire, Alaska, Texas and Florida.
Thus, many of the states that seem “Safe” on the map are anything but, as their realigning electorates shift back against the Republican brand, with all of them having recent histories in electoral cycles of favoring Democrats or being true swing states. Take states like Florida and Texas where suburban margins began to erode for the GOP in the Trump era but countered that by massive margin shifts in hispanic and black precincts. Primary participation, voter identification, and public opinion surveys show those black and hispanic voters shifting back massively away from the GOP brand, which, given the erosion in some suburban areas and losses with younger generations, makes states Florida and Texas closer to competitive than double-digit leans.
In big swing election cycles, even “safe” Senate seats can suddenly turn razor close, as Bob Dole found out in 1974, barely holding on to his Kansas seat before being the VP nominee two years later. Strong independent candidates in Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota and Montana may pose a unique threat to GOP held seats, as the Nebraska race in 2024 showed, with Osborn running 17 points ahead of Harris’ margin in the state. Democrats field the much better candidate in Ohio with a proven track record of out-performing Democratic margins in the state, while the Texas GOP nominee faces abandonment from his own party after they spent over $100M bashing him in the state for a disliked party incumbent. Alaska primary results suggest the Democratic nominee already holds the edge in that ranked choice voting state, while the famed cross-over support for Collins in Maine appears to be fading with newer generations taking over the voter rolls. My current map would be as follows, with surprising closer-than-expected races in Montana, Kansas, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, South Dakota, South Carolina and Kentucky, and a median map of Democrats holding 53+ Senate seats after the 2026 elections.

If past is prologue, the map won’t save the GOP in 2026, and an ever bigger tsunami may be incoming than anyone in Washington expects.