Nations League 17th November 2026 - My Picks
1% Wales +1.5 vs Portugal at 53c (good to 58c)
1% Denmark vs Norway to end in draw at 23c (good to 26c)
1% Denmark vs Norway over 3.5 goals at 40c (good to 47c)
1% Denmark vs Norway both teams to score at 67c (good to 72c)
1% Sweden to win vs Poland at 32c (good to 35c)
1% Hungary vs Northern Ireland to end in draw at 29c (good to 32c)
1% Bosnia and Herzegovina not to lose vs Romania at 73c (good to 78c)
1% Ireland vs Kosovo to end in draw at 30c (good to 32c)
First of all my apologies for getting these picks out so late, I was away from my computer for a while and only had a chance to get back about five minutes before kick off. I only added the Ireland one just after the game was due to kick off because I had a late draw order get filled. Those positions are generally OK to take a little bit after kick off so maybe some of you managed to get in on them but if not, apologies again. With that, I will now go through what my thinking was for each of these positions.
Wales vs Portugal
Portugal only need to avoid defeat to top the group and their qualification for the quarter finals is assured regardless. They are also dealing with some injuries, such as to Nuno Mendes and Rafael Leão, who are crucial to their wide play. Wales have some big absences too, such as Ethan Ampadu, who is important for Wales' defensive structure. Wales manager Craig Bellamy emphasised the importance of staying compact in the face of Portugal's attack, Portugal's high press has injected big energy into Portugal under Jorge Jesus but there have been times when teams have been able to find space behind their press, such as Denmark in their 4-1 win away to Portugal. Even though Portugal were on the front foot in their 1-0 win over Wales in Lisbon, Wales did have their chances. Wales have also had decent chance creation over the course of the campaign and their results haven't been quite as good as their underlying chance creation would suggest. At home I think a goal and a half is a bit much for this spread, especially with Wales making adjustments and Portugal missing some players important to their offence.
Denmark vs Norway
Norway need a big win to keep their chances of qualifying for the quarter finals alive and so I am expecting a game in which Norway are willing to take risks. Denmark meanwhile don't mind pressing high up the pitch so I expect there will be space for both teams to operate in on the break. Denmark still have a chance of winning the group as Portugal need to avoid defeat to prevent that from coming into play. So this is a game where fortune very much favours the brave. In spite of this, I still think the draw was a bit undervalued as these teams are quite evenly matched and I wouldn't rule out whichever team is trailing down the stretch having the last word. I also like Erling Haaland to score a couple but liquidity for that was a bit touch and go so I didn't include it in the picks.
Poland vs Sweden
Sweden have already topped the group after their win against Bosnia and Herzegovina while Poland could still get relegated if Romania overtake them in the standings. Poland do have a proactive playstyle where they are willing to attack through combinations but Sweden's style is quite pragmatic where they're willing to defend and then attack through quick transitions with them having players that are good at exploiting to space. Alexander Isak was named on the bench in a rotated side but I think he is likely to come on at some point as Sweden look to finish the campaign strong.
Hungary vs Northern Ireland
Hungary need a win to top the group while Northern Ireland only need a draw. Michael O'Neill's side is very good at defending compactly and playing to the result rather than playing to the goals. If the game is tight late on I expect them to be able to launch attacks enough to get an equaliser if they need it as Hungary have not been the most secure late in the game but if the game is level I think Northern Ireland will look to take the sting out of the game.
Bosnia and Herzegovina vs Romania
Bosnia have already secured second place and Romania need a win to avoid automatic relegation. Against a side like Bosnia that is very well set up to defend, this is no easy proposition. Romania like to build up through progressive combinations and isolating opposing fullbacks against their wingers. Against Sergej Barbarez' compact shape that often uses three centrebacks, finding isolated space can be difficult. I don't have a preference for Bosnia win or draw so that is why I am going with Romania not to win.
Ireland vs Kosovo
Ireland need a win to reach the promotion playoffs while Kosovo need only avoid defeat. I do give Ireland a good chance of taking the lead but they have not always been good at seeing out leads. Kosovo meanwhile are comfortable in possession and buildup so if this game is level late I would give them a good chance of seeing out the game.
Two conflicting trends dictate the Senate outcome in 2026. The map heavily favors Republicans, as the competitive Senate seats up lean heavily Republican. By contrast, the election context heavily favors Democrats, with war, recession, realignment and scandal tipping in their direction. A deeper dive reveals why prediction markets still likely undersell Democratic prospects.
First, the idea that Senate midterms favor the party out of power in the White House is belied by both recent and a century of history of Senate elections. Unlike the House, only a third of Senate seats face election in any midterm, and that map dictates outcomes unless the election context is particularly bad for the incumbent party.
Consider that the highly unpopular Biden didn’t lost any net Senate seats in 2022 and Trump added Senate seats in the Democratic friendly cycle in 2018. Equally, Clinton didn’t lose net Senate seats in 1998 nor did W. in 2002. Even low-approval election cycles like 1966 and 1982 didn’t produce a big swing in the Senate. Indeed, since 1934, the party in power only lost 10% or more of their Senate seats (4+) less than half of the time. Democrats need a flip of exactly that — at least 4 Senate seats — to retake power in the Senate.
Then take a look at the map, and you can see the reason for optimism in GOP circles and some traders in the prediction markets. Only 2 GOP-held seats are in states Trump won by less than double digits, while 2 Democratic-held seats are in states Trump won, and one of those GOP held seats features a long-time incumbent who typically runs double-digits ahead of the GOP norm (Collins in Maine). This is why the GOP entered the year believing odds of losing the Senate were remote, and the prediction markets mostly concurred.
But this ignores the counter-trend: the degree of election dismay with the incumbent party in the White House, and the reasons for that dismay. Presidential job approval has not been a neat proxy for Senate midterms because it depends on the reason for that dissatisfaction in the electorate. Four factors drive Senatorial midterms: war, recession/cost of living, realignment, and scandal. When two of those four factors are not present and don’t dominate, then the incumbent party’s odds of losing 4+ Senate seats drops to less than 20%. By contrast, when two of those four factors are present and do predominate, then the odds of the incumbent party losing 4+ Senate seats rises to 100%. Indeed, the median number of Senate seats lost when some combination of war, recession, realignment and scandal, are present, the White House party loses at least 8 Senate seats.
A few examples: while FDR added Senate seats in 1934 midterms, he lost 9 in 1938 midterms due to the combination of recession and scandal (trying to stack SCOTUS). 1942 and 1946 gave us war and recession to cost Democrats 8 and 12 Senate seats alike. 1950 gave us war again and scandals concerning the war costing Democrats 5 Senate seats. 1958 gave us recession and scandal, costing Ike 15 Senate seats. While JFK added Senate seats in 1962 and Nixon added Senate seats in 1970, only Watergate and stagflation in 1974 or the combination of Iran Contra and vulnerable class of 1980 incumbents cost the incumbent party 4 or more Senate seats until the realignment election of 1994, where evangelicals shifted their down-ballot voting to the GOP en masse. It took war and scandal in 2006 to see the Senate switch 4+ Senate seats again.
That’s the story of 2026: a very GOP favorable Senate map versus a very Democratic friendly election cycle. The GOP enters election season with all four factor present: war, recession/cost of living, realignment, and scandal. The Iran War was already deeply unpopular, and it’s impact on the economy in gas and diesel prices turns Americans sour on their current economic prospects, as wages fall behind, housing and health care feel increasingly unaffordable, labor force participation continues to drop, the the mirage of AI keeps the GDP just above a technical recession. The Epstein scandal remains one of the worst scandals in American political history, and Trump managed to associate himself deeply with the scandal in his handling of it. Then the realignment, as the new Trump 2024 voters joined the Obama-Trump converts of 2016 in abandoning GOP identity, already evident in surveys and primary participation.
A quintet of voter groups appear to be realigning away from the Republican brand — hispanic voters, black voters, industrial area voters, libertarian-leaning voters, and war-skeptical voters alike. This realigning electorate shows up disproportionately in key Senate contests. The war-skeptical voters in states like Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, and Alaska (these are the states W failed to gain in between 2000 and 2004 due to the Iraq War before it even turned unpopular). The hispanic voters in states like Florida and Texas. The African-American voters in states like North Carolina and Georgia. The industrial voters in Ohio and Michigan. The libertarian leaving voters in states like New Hampshire, Alaska, Texas and Florida.
Thus, many of the states that seem “Safe” on the map are anything but, as their realigning electorates shift back against the Republican brand, with all of them having recent histories in electoral cycles of favoring Democrats or being true swing states. Take states like Florida and Texas where suburban margins began to erode for the GOP in the Trump era but countered that by massive margin shifts in hispanic and black precincts. Primary participation, voter identification, and public opinion surveys show those black and hispanic voters shifting back massively away from the GOP brand, which, given the erosion in some suburban areas and losses with younger generations, makes states Florida and Texas closer to competitive than double-digit leans.
In big swing election cycles, even “safe” Senate seats can suddenly turn razor close, as Bob Dole found out in 1974, barely holding on to his Kansas seat before being the VP nominee two years later. Strong independent candidates in Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota and Montana may pose a unique threat to GOP held seats, as the Nebraska race in 2024 showed, with Osborn running 17 points ahead of Harris’ margin in the state. Democrats field the much better candidate in Ohio with a proven track record of out-performing Democratic margins in the state, while the Texas GOP nominee faces abandonment from his own party after they spent over $100M bashing him in the state for a disliked party incumbent. Alaska primary results suggest the Democratic nominee already holds the edge in that ranked choice voting state, while the famed cross-over support for Collins in Maine appears to be fading with newer generations taking over the voter rolls. My current map would be as follows, with surprising closer-than-expected races in Montana, Kansas, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, South Dakota, South Carolina and Kentucky, and a median map of Democrats holding 53+ Senate seats after the 2026 elections.

If past is prologue, the map won’t save the GOP in 2026, and an ever bigger tsunami may be incoming than anyone in Washington expects.